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The Autonomous Operations Planner (AOP), developed by NASA, is a flexible and 
powerful prototype of a flight-deck automation system to support self-separation of aircraft. 
The AOP incorporates a variety of algorithms to detect and resolve conflicts between the 
trajectories of its own aircraft and traffic aircraft while meeting route constraints such as 
required times of arrival and avoiding airspace hazards such as convective weather and 
restricted airspace. This integrated suite of algorithms provides flight crew support for 
strategic and tactical conflict resolutions and conflict-free trajectory planning while en 
route. The AOP has supported an extensive set of experiments covering various conditions 
and variations on the self-separation concept, yielding insight into the system’s design and 
resolving various challenges encountered in the exploration of the concept. The design of the 
AOP will enable it to continue to evolve and support experimentation as the self-separation 
concept is refined. 
Nomenclature 
ACCoRD = Airborne Coordinated Conflict Resolution and Detection 
ADS-B = Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 
AFR = Autonomous Flight Rules 
ALT HLD = Altitude Hold 
ATC = Air Traffic Control 
ATOS = Airspace and Traffic Operation Simulation 
CD = Conflict Detection 
CD&R = Conflict Detection and Resolution 
CR = Conflict Resolution 
ETA = Estimated Time of Arrival 
FCC = Flight Control Computer 
FLCH = Flight Level Change 
FMS = Flight Management System 
FPA HLD = Flight Path Angle Hold 
HDG HLD = Heading Hold 
HDG SEL = Heading Select 
IFR = Instrument Flight Rules 
LaRC = Langley Research Center 
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LNAV = Lateral Navigation 
LOS = Loss of Separation 
MCDU = Multifunction Control Display Unit 
MCP = Mode Control Panel 
MR = Maneuver Restriction 
PBGA = Pattern-Based Genetic Algorithm 
RTA = Required Time of Arrival 
SICR = Strategic Intent-based Conflict Resolution 
SNAPI = Status Notifications and Planning Indicators 
SVR = State Vector Report 
SWIM = System Wide Information Management 
TCP = Trajectory Change Point 
TCR = Trajectory Change Report 
TICR = Tactical Intent-based Conflict Resolution 
TPUBs = Trajectory Prediction Uncertainty Bounds 
TRK HLD = Track Hold 
TRK SEL = Track Select 
TSR = Target State Report 
V/R HLD = Vertical Rate Hold 
VNAV = Vertical Navigation 
I. Introduction 
s commercial airspace continues to suffer from congestion, heavy workloads on current air traffic control 
(ATC) personnel and systems, unpredictable local weather conditions, and other effects of airspace complexity, 
research continues on ways to alleviate these problems. 
One approach that has been investigated is to equip aircraft to perform self-separation, a procedure by which an 
aircraft provides for its own separation from other aircraft. A flight-deck system designed for this purpose can 
perform several functions. For example, such a system can alert an air crew to a potential loss of separation with 
other aircraft or penetration of severe weather conditions. The system can also probe alternative trajectories of the 
aircraft in order to avoid these problems. This can enable crews to self-separate from other aircraft, as proposed 
under the Autonomous Flight Rules (AFR) concept.
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 Alternatively, under conventional Instrument Flight Rules 
(IFR), crews might use such a system as an aid to composing requests to ATC for clearances that are more likely to 
be granted. 
The Autonomous Operations Planner (AOP), developed under contract to NASA Langley Research Center, is a 
prototype of such a system. Designed as a research tool, it is an instrument for investigating the properties and 
benefits of a variety of systems of this general type that might be implemented. The AOP has been extensively 
studied within the Airspace and Traffic Operation Simulation (ATOS) platform, a networked flight-deck simulation 
environment that models real-world standard interfaces and enables extensive feasibility testing of ATM concepts.
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In the remaining sections of this paper, we discuss the motivation for flight-deck support for airborne self-
separation. We document several functions that can be performed by the AOP in the context of research into air 
traffic management concepts. We show some issues in the general design of such systems that have been illustrated 
during the development and experimental usage of the AOP. Finally, we comment on the future directions this 
development and experimentation may take. 
II. Motivations for Flight-Deck Support for Airborne Self-Separation 
The concept of autonomous flight with self-separation has been studied since at least 1965.
3
 By performing some 
of the functions of separation of air traffic, a system on the aircraft flight deck can help reduce the load on ground-
based systems, especially as airspace becomes more complex.
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The AFR concept, in particular, promises more complete use of airspace between the jet routes, potentially 
raising capacity or mitigating capacity loss due to weather systems while providing substantial user benefits in flight 
efficiency and operational flexibility.
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Automated support for airborne self-separation is necessary even for relatively simple tasks, largely because it is 
difficult for pilots to visualize the interactions between aircraft. This difficulty is exacerbated when aircraft are 
turning, climbing, or descending, or have an intent to turn, climb, or descend later. The difficulty further increases as 
the number of proximate aircraft increases, and increases again in the presence of weather and special-use airspaces 
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(SUAs) that aircraft must avoid. A maneuver to avoid one hazard (such as traffic or weather) may put the 
maneuvering aircraft in the way of a different hazard. Finally, the aircraft may also be subject to arrival flow 
management constraints such as a required time of arrival (RTA) at a fixed waypoint, which must be met by any 
proposed maneuver. Controllers have need 
for automated support to avoid problems, 
air crews even more so. 
The AOP seeks to support airborne 
self-separation at many levels of 
complexity. Its intended applications range 
from homogeneous operations to mixed 
air-ground separation operations; from 
current-day traffic density to many 
multiples of current day; and from highly 
flexible, unconstrained operations to flight 
constrained by arrival times, airspace 
hazards, and aircraft performance limits. 
Figure 1 is a simplified illustration of this 
concept.  
III. Basic Concepts and Definitions to Support Self-Separation 
The explanation of the capabilities of the AOP will rely on the following definitions: 
A. The Ownship 
Because of the nature of a flight-deck system, most of the phenomena involving the AOP are most easily 
described from the perspective of a single AOP-equipped aircraft. Except when otherwise indicated, therefore, the 
following definitions and discussion refer to one such aircraft as the ownship aircraft (or simply ―the ownship‖), and 
―the AOP‖ refers to the instance of the AOP that is installed and operating on the ownship. 
B. Hazards 
There are two main classes of hazards defined in AOP: 
 All aircraft in flight other than the ownship are considered traffic aircraft. Traffic aircraft constitute one 
main class of hazards. 
 The other main class of hazards, area hazards, consists of weather cells, SUAs, terrain, and any other such 
three-dimensional regions that are excluded from the usable airspace. 
Due to practical considerations, a system such as the AOP should not assume that area hazards are permanent or 
fixed in space and time. Some SUAs apply only during predetermined time intervals; weather cells can appear, 
disappear, or move in a relatively unpredictable fashion. 
C. Aircraft States and Intents 
The AOP considers a state of an aircraft to consist of instantaneous data, such as the aircraft‘s pressure altitude, 
latitude, longitude, airspeed, groundspeed, heading, true course or track angle, vertical rate, and aircraft weight, that 
can be sensed or derived from sensed data. An intent of an aircraft consists of any information that AOP might 
receive about how the aircraft‘s guidance systems will control its flight path. From a given state and intent, it is 
possible to predict or infer future states of the aircraft. Any change to that intent that results in different predicted 
future states is considered to be a maneuver. 
D. Conflicts 
Consistent with the precedent of today‘s ground-based separation services for aircraft under IFR, each aircraft 
has a certain required lateral separation and a certain required vertical separation. For example, a typical set of 
separation requirements considered in experiments with the AOP has been five miles lateral separation for AOP-
equipped aircraft (reflecting existing separation requirements), with an additional buffer around ground-separated 
IFR aircraft (providing additional assurance that AOP-based operations do not interfere with conventional 
operations), and 1000 feet vertical separation for all aircraft. A loss of separation (LOS) between the ownship and a 
traffic aircraft occurs when two conditions apply simultaneously:  
 
 
Figure 1. Global trajectory based self-separation with constraints. 




 the lateral distance between the two aircraft is less than the defined minimum separation standard between 
these aircraft, and 
 the magnitude of the difference between the altitudes of the aircraft is also less than the prescribed 
minimum separation.  
We also say that LOS occurs between the ownship and an area hazard when the ownship penetrates that area 
hazard, that is, when the ownship is within the region defined by that hazard at that time. 
A conflict is a predicted LOS, that is, a LOS that might occur based on predicted future states of the ownship and 
hazards. A conflict may be either: 
 a traffic conflict, consisting of predicted states of the ownship and a traffic aircraft that will be in LOS at 
the time when those states are predicted to occur; or 
 an area-hazard conflict, consisting of an area hazard and a predicted state of the ownship that will penetrate 
the region occupied by that hazard at the time when that state is predicted to occur. 
E. Conflict Resolution and Conflict Prevention 
An overarching objective of AOP is to perform conflict resolution (CR), that is, to detect conflicts and resolve 
them by recommending maneuvers that will avoid LOS. In addition to this primary flight-safety function, AOP also 
has the objective of conflict prevention, the process of planning maneuvers that do not cause conflicts between the 
ownship and other aircraft. Integrated conflict resolution and prevention in AOP provides maneuvers that are free of 
all conflicts while enabling pilots to avoid conflicts in other contemplated maneuvers. 
F. Intent-Based, State-Based, Strategic, and Tactical Functions 
The AOP considers the ownship to be in a strategic flight mode when it is following the active route of the 
Flight Management System (FMS) with the Lateral Navigation (LNAV) and Vertical Navigation (VNAV) functions 
of the FMS engaged. When the ownship is not under LNAV and VNAV guidance, it is considered to be in a tactical 
flight mode. Various ―strategic‖ and ―tactical‖ functions are related to the strategic and tactial flight modes, 
respectively. 
Most of the functions of the AOP are intent-based, that is, they attempt to account for the intent of an aircraft to 
the extent that the intent is specified. Some intent-based functions are denoted as ―strategic‖ or ―tactical‖ functions 
depending on the flight modes of the intents those functions might receive. State-based functions, on the other hand, 
never use any information about aircraft intent, and are always considered tactical.  
For ease of exposition, the next several sections of the paper describe intent-based functions before considering 
state-based functions and their relationship to the intent-based functions.  
IV. Intent-Based Trajectory Prediction 
Clearly, the usefulness of either conflict resolution or conflict prevention depends on making appropriate 
predictions of conflicts, which in turn depends on predictions of the ownship trajectory as well as traffic trajectories 
and area-hazard locations. For the purpose of intent-based functions, the AOP predicts trajectories as described 
below. 
A. Intent-Based Ownship Trajectory Prediction 
1. Supported Flight Modes 
The AOP can predict intent-based ownship trajectory based on the ownship‘s state and either the ownship‘s 
actual intent or a hypothetical intent. The AOP can predict trajectories for intents in various flight modes as 
determined by data that have been received (or that could be received) from the the Flight Control Computer (FCC), 
the Mode Control Panel (MCP), and optionally the FMS. Lateral modes include LNAV, track hold, track select 
(TRK SEL), heading hold, and heading select (HDG SEL), where tracks and headings may be relative to magnetic 
north or true north. Vertical modes include VNAV,
††
 altitude hold (ALT HLD),
‡‡
 vertical rate hold (V/R HLD), 
flight path angle hold (FPA HLD), and flight level change (FLCH). 
Ideally, when the intent specifies ―pure‖ LNAV and VNAV guidance, the AOP‘s prediction will be identical to 
that of the FMS. (In fact, the AOP uses the prediction code from the prototype FMS in its research environment 
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the speed and altitude profile of the relevant FMS route. The AOP also recognizes a VNAV ALT mode; this mode 
behaves like altitude hold, and is not discussed further in this paper. 
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when it predicts these trajectories.) If the intent specifies LNAV and VNAV guidance but also specifies a 
commanded altitude setting of the MCP, the initial portion of the predicted trajectory will be identical to the 
trajectory of the ―pure‖ LNAV/VNAV intent, but will ―level off‖ at the commanded altitude at the first point where 
the trajectory would otherwise cross or depart from that altitude. Trajectories for tactical intents (namely, all other 
combinations of FCC and MCP settings) are predicted by a modular design that allows the trajectory prediction code 
to combine the equations of motion for appropriate lateral and vertical profiles over any time interval of the 
trajectory, and to detect the points along the trajectory at which those equations should change.  
2. Trajectory Data Structure and Lookahead Time 
The predicted trajectory of the ownship consists primarily of a sequence of discrete states, each of which is 
considered a multi-dimensional ―point‖ along the trajectory. A principal goal of trajectory prediction is to assign a 
latitude, longitude, altitude, and time at each of these trajectory points as accurately as possible, as these are the 
properties that support conflict detection and related functions. On the other hand, in order to support these 
functions, it is generally sufficient for the AOP to generate trajectory points that span a time interval of a 
predetermined length, starting at the current time. (The length of this interval is called the lookahead time of the 
trajectory.) The AOP therefore seldom generates a sequence of trajectory points all the way to the end of a flight. 
The predicted trajectory may, however, include additional information (such as aircraft weight at destination) 
computed for events later than the last trajectory point, In particular, if the ownship intent is to follow full LNAV 
and VNAV guidance to a waypoint with a time constraint, the AOP will compute a predicted time of arrival at that 
waypoint and will record the difference between that predicted time and the RTA at that waypoint. 
B. Intent-Based Traffic Trajectory Prediction 
Traffic trajectories are based on data received by the ownship from external data sources. Past research using the 
AOP has relied almost exclusively on Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) reports sent by the 
traffic aircraft for both states and intents of traffic aircraft. An intent-based traffic trajectory may be inferred from 
any of the following combinations of ADS-B reports: 
 a State Vector Report (SVR) and either a Trajectory Change Report (TCR) or a cycle of multiple TCRs; 
 an SVR and a Target State Report (TSR); or 
 an SVR alone. 
When the traffic aircraft provides TCRs, each TCR specifying a trajectory change point (TCP) with a latitude, 
longitude, altitude, and estimated time of arrival (ETA),
§§
 the mean ground speed and mean vertical rate between 
two TCPs can be estimated from the path length, difference in altitude, and difference in ETA along the portion of 
the trajectory between the two TCPs. Since the source of these data is the transmitting aircraft‘s navigation system, 
this trajectory represents a high-quality prediction of the aircraft‘s future intent. 
Whereas some aircraft may broadcast TCRs, others may not. If a traffic aircraft sends a TSR but no TCR, the 
target state (from the TSR) enables the AOP to model an initial turn or a level-off point at a specified altitude in the 
predicted trajectory. This typically results in a lower-quality prediction than can be obtained with a cycle of TCRs. 
If the traffic aircraft sends neither a TCR nor a TSR, the AOP will predict a trajectory by means of a state 
projection forward from the most recent SVR. In other words, the AOP will assume that the traffic aircraft starts at 
the latitude, longitude, altitude, and time reported in the SVR, and assumes that the aircraft flies at a constant ground 
speed and vertical speed along the great-circle course corresponding to its initial position and ground track. While 
this is not obviously an ―intent-based‖ trajectory, it is treated as one for the purpose of all intent-based functions, 
since it represents the AOP‘s best effort to use any available intent data in the trajectory prediction. 
The use of data sources other than ADS-B is limited only by the requirement for the existence of software 
functions to infer a sequence of predicted states from the incoming data. Recently, Flight Object data from the 
System Wide Information Management (SWIM) program have been considered as a basis for inferring traffic 
trajectories in the AOP.
***
 The latitudes, longitudes, altitudes, and ETAs at consecutive points in a Flight Object 
uplinked to an AOP-equipped aircraft can be used to estimate mean ground speed and mean vertical rate along the 
path between the two points. When SWIM and ADS-B are both available for a particular traffic aircraft, a proposed 
method for trajectory prediction is to prefer to predict a trajectory from TCRs (if available) rather that SWIM, but to 
prefer to use SWIM (if available) rather than a TSR. 
                                                          
§§
 ETA is not explicitly specified by a TCR, but can be computed by adding the time to go (TTG) to the time of 
applicability (TOA). 
***
 In the AFR concept, the provision of Flight Object data to aircraft as part of SWIM is a conceptual alternative to 
widespread ADS-B intent broadcast. 




V. Intent-Based Conflict Detection  
Conflict detection (CD) is the process of finding conflicts between the ownship and hazards. Intent-based CD is 
CD that uses intent-based trajectories. The AOP can perform a probe of any intent-based ownship trajectory by 
comparing states predicted by the selected ownship trajectory to states predicted by the trajectory of each traffic 
aircraft and to the predicted locations of each area hazard known to the AOP. This probe may detect one or more 
conflicts with traffic aircraft or area hazards. 
When a conflict occurs, there is a range of predicted ownship states spanning a period of time (usually longer 
than a single instant) during which each ownship state is in LOS with the hazard that caused this conflict. The 
earliest predicted ownship state in this range is called the first LOS with respect to this conflict. 
It is readily apparent that the usefulness of the AOP—namely, its ability to effectively resolve or prevent 
conflicts—depends in large part on the accuracy of CD, that is, the ability to predict whether a given ownship intent 
will result in LOS with one or more hazards. Experience has supported that statement. The accuracy of CD, in turn, 
clearly depends on the ability to accurately predict ownship states, traffic states, and the applicable times and 
locations of area hazards. 
A. Causes and Effects of Uncertainty in Predictions 
For several reasons, it is generally not practical to predict aircraft trajectories perfectly. The path of an aircraft is 
influenced by many interacting factors, including guidance algorithms, control surfaces, throttle settings, properties 
of the airframe, and properties of the surrounding air mass (including temperature, density, and the speed and 
direction of wind). In the course of any prediction over a time interval that is useful to the AOP, some of these 
factors (such as the future wind fields into which the aircraft will fly) are subject to unpredictable variations that can 
cause significant prediction errors, that is, differences between predicted and actual aircraft states. There is therefore 
an unavoidable prediction uncertainty inherent in any predicted trajectory. 
Traffic trajectories suffer from additional sources of prediction error. A cycle of TCRs will not describe all the 
details (such as variations in speed or flight path angle during a descent) that can be modeled in a trajectory 
produced by the AOP or by an FMS. Moreover, an aircraft may not send TCRs, and TCRs sent may not be received, 
forcing a fallback to even less accurate modeling of traffic trajectories. 
In the presence of these sources of uncertainty, the AOP makes certain other approximations in its predictions 
for the sake of computational feasibility. For example, the AOP may have to compute ownship paths covering 
several orders of magnitude more cycles of the guidance systems than the aircraft actually flies in the same period of 
time.
6
 The interactions among guidance, airframe, engines, and the atmosphere are simplified, and the points along a 
trajectory predicted by AOP represent a piecewise linear approximation of non-linear motion. The combined effect 
of these approximations is expected to be small in comparison to other sources of error that cannot be avoided. 
If trajectory predictions, area-hazard locations, and the conflict detection algorithm were all completely accurate, 
detection of a conflict would indicate that a LOS would occur if no change is made to the ownship intent or (if this is 
a traffic conflict) the traffic aircraft intent. In fact, prediction errors can result in false positive conflicts (―false 
alerts‖ in which a conflict is detected but no LOS actually would have occurred) and false negative conflicts 
(―missed alerts‖ in which the aircraft would actually fly into LOS but no conflict is detected). 
B. Accounting for Uncertainty 
An obvious way to reduce prediction uncertainty is to address the sources of error in predictions. Once this 
process has been carried to a certain point, however, the benefit of further accuracy improvements will be 
outweighed by their costs, especially if the remaining uncertainty is dominated by unavoidable components. After 
that point, the approach to CD is typically driven by the perception that the cost of a missed alert (in terms of safety 
and eventual crew workload) is greater than the cost of a false alert. One therefore implements techniques that are 
expected to reduce the frequency of missed alerts while accepting the idea that these techniques will likely increase 
the frequency of false alerts. 
One way to reduce the frequency of missed alerts is to add ―buffers‖ to the lateral and vertical separation 
requirements when performing conflict detection. For example, if CD assumes that 5.2 nautical miles lateral 
separation is required, a ―no conflict‖ result implies a LOS could occur only at a time when the lateral positional 
error of the ownship (or combined lateral positional error of ownship and traffic aircraft) is at least 0.2 nautical 
miles. For this reason (among others), the separation requirements in the AOP can be independently configured for 
different research experiments. 
A somewhat more sophisticated approach is to make the separation requirements between aircraft a function of 
time or of distance traveled. This approach neglects the observation that in typical operations, the positional error of 




aircraft trajectories along their tracks at any given time has a very different probability distribution than the error in 
the perpendicular (cross-track) lateral direction. It is therefore advantageous to introduce a directional bias in the 
algorithm, for example by modeling an ellipsoidal probability distribution of the aircraft‘s position relative to the 
nominal trajectory (which is the simple path described earlier in the context of trajectory prediction).
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The approach taken in the AOP is to model three independently-measured dimensions of prediction error around 
the nominal trajectory. For each consecutive pair of points of the nominal trajectory that the AOP stores in its 
prediction, the AOP computes trajectory prediction uncertainty bounds (TPUBs) that define a four-dimensional 
―box‖ around the segment of the trajectory between those two points. In order to relate prediction errors 
independently to different segments of the trajectory, the AOP models along-path errors as follows: 
 An error that results in the aircraft being farther along the path at a given time than the nominal prediction 
for that time is treated as arriving ―too early‖ at the point actually reached. 
 An error that results in the aircraft being less far along the path at a given time than the nominal prediction 
for that time is treated as arriving ―too late‖ at the point actually reached. 
Along-path error is therefore expressed in terms of a ―time of arrival error‖ at a given distance along the path. 
The TPUBs can independently specify altitude bounds above the nominal path, altitude bounds below the 
nominal path, cross-track bounds, and along-path bounds. Moreover, the ―box‖ can be ―tapered‖ by allowing any of 
the independent bounds to increase or decrease linearly from one trajectory point to the next. (The bounds along the 
segment between any pair of points are therefore controlled by eight mutually-independent parameters.) The CD 
algorithm then finds conflicts that can result from any state inside those bounds.
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Since these TPUBs are assigned during the procedure of trajectory prediction, when the flight modes that 
generate the trajectory are known, the TPUBs can be made to fit a unique model of uncertainty for each flight mode, 
and even to fit a unique model of uncertainty for each segment or phase of a flight mode. Because of this feature, 
and because the model of along-path error uses distance along path rather than time as its independent dimension, 
the AOP can construct a continuous, self-consistent set of TPUBs that follows any trajectory around turns, across a 
transition into or out of a climb or descent, or through any other change in speed, vertical rate, or flight path angle. 
Moreover, the TPUBs can be tuned to the predicted behavior of the aircraft at any point along its trajectory in such a 
way as to prevent the class of missed alerts anticipated at that point while accepting a near-minimal increase in the 
likelihood of a false alert at that point. 
C. Closest Point of Approach 
During the procedure of conflict detection, the AOP monitors the closest point of approach of each traffic 
aircraft relative to the ownship. This information is made available to cockpit displays for use in ―filtering‖ the 
traffic aircraft that are to be displayed to the crew. 
VI. Active Trajectory Probing 
The AOP is able to notify the air crew when the current intent of the ownship is likely to cause problems, 
including conflicts with traffic aircraft, conflicts with area hazards, or missing an RTA at a waypoint ahead of the 
aircraft on the active route of the FMS.  
In order to support this capability, the AOP periodically performs conflict probes—a primary probe and 
sometimes a secondary probe—according to the procedures described below. 
A. The Primary Probe 
The primary probe is performed on an ownship trajectory that is based on an intent derived from the current 
settings of the FCC, MCP, and FMS. When the vertical guidance mode is ALT HLD, V/R HLD, FPA HLD, or 
FLCH, the trajectory is predicted using all of these settings, assuming that the crew make no modifications to the 
intent at any time. In the VNAV guidance mode, however, it is assumed that the trajectory of primary interest is the 
one that follows the vertical profile determined by VNAV, without regard to the commanded altitude currently set 
on the MCP. That is, the primary probe uses a trajectory that does not ―level off‖ as described in Section IV. For the 
purpose of this probe, it is assumed that the crew will adjust the commanded altitude on the MCP as needed to 
prevent level-off. 
The interpretation of commanded altitude in the primary probe is based on the experience of professional pilots 
using the AOP in studies of the AFR concept. For example, when the ownship is in the cruise segment of an FMS 
active route with LNAV and VNAV guidance engaged, a typical procedure pilots might follow is to leave the 
commanded altitude set at the cruise altitude until shortly before the aircraft needs to descend. If the ownship is 
cruising at 30,000 feet, and the next waypoint in the route is constrained to a maximum altitude of 10,000 feet, the 




FMS will have plotted the point at which the top of descent (TOD) should occur for the descent to that waypoint. In 
that case, the crew typically will adjust the commanded altitude to 10,000 feet shortly before the ownship reaches 
that TOD. 
Any conflict detected by this probe is a primary conflict. 
B. The Secondary Probe 
The secondary probe is performed only when all of the following conditions are true: 
 the VNAV guidance mode is engaged, and 
 the current setting of the commanded altitude eventually would cause the ownship to level off, and 
 the interval from the current time to the level-off point is less than the lookahead time of the trajectory used 
in the primary probe. 
When the secondary probe is performed, it uses a trajectory that is predicted from the exact intent determined by 
the current settings of the FCC, MCP, and FMS, including the commanded altitude. This trajectory ―levels off‖ at 
the point where the VNAV vertical profile would have crossed or departed from the commanded altitude. 
The secondary probe is performed because there is an ambiguity in the translation of the aircraft‘s current 
guidance modes to the intent from which the primary probe‘s trajectory is predicted. The crew may have a reason 
not to adjust the commanded altitude before flying past the TOD computed by the FMS. In that case, the aircraft 
might fly into a LOS that the primary probe cannot predict, because the level-off has caused the ownship to depart 
from the trajectory predicted by the primary probe. The secondary probe is intended to detect any conflict 
corresponding to such a LOS. Such a conflict is a secondary conflict. 
C. Alerting the Crew to Results of Probes 
The AOP has implemented several techniques to alert the crew when a conflict occurs in either a primary probe 
or a secondary probe. Figure 2 illustrates the notification of a primary conflict on the navigation display (ND), and 
Fig. 3 shows the corresponding notification on the Status Notifications and Planning Indicators (SNAPI) display. 
When the ownship‘s LNAV and VNAV guidance modes are engaged and the active route includes an RTA, the 
AOP also notifies the crew if the ownship will ―miss‖ the RTA, that is, if the ownship is predicted to arrive too soon 
or too late at that RTA. 
 
 
Figure 2. Conflict notification on the ND. 
 
 
Figure 3. Conflict notification on SNAPI 
display. 




VII. Conflict Prevention 
Unlike Active Conflict Detection capabilities that detect conflicts with the aircraft‘s current guidance settings, 
AOP‘s Conflict Prevention capabilities detect conflicts for proposed changes to the current settings. AOP has four 
separate conflict prevention capabilities: FMS MOD Route probe, Tactical Planning probe, Active Route Recouple 
probe, and Maneuver Restriction (MR) bands. Each of these capabilities analyzes one or more potential changes to 
the aircraft‘s current guidance settings and alerts the flight crew to any predicted conflicts prior to implementing the 
guidance changes. Conflict prevention is a critical component of the AFR concept because these capabilities enable 
the flight crew to modify their flight path at their discretion (i.e., without direction from AOP) while avoiding the 
creation of unacceptable conflicts with other aircraft. It is these capabilities that enable the flight crew to have 
flexibility in choosing their desired guidance approach while 
maintaining the requirements of self-separation. 
The three conflict prevention probes (FMS MOD Route, 
Tactical Planning, and Active Route Recouple) each have their own 
automatic triggering mechanism and their own indicator line on the 
SNAPI (see Fig. 4). The triggering and display options are 
described in the capability descriptions below. In contrast, MR 
Bands are continuously calculated and displayed on the Primary 
Flight Display (PFD) and Navigation Display. 
A. FMS MOD Route Probe 
The FMS MOD Route probe is automatically initiated by AOP whenever a MOD route is created in the FMS. 
The purposes of the FMS MOD Route probe are to alert the crew to any undesirable impacts on AFR procedures if 
the current MOD route were implemented and to enable these impacts to be resolved prior to implementation.  
A MOD route represents a proposed modification to the FMS‘s active route and is implemented in the guidance 
system by executing the MOD route and engaging LNAV and VNAV. When executed, the MOD route becomes the 
new active route by replacing the previous active route. MOD routes can be generated by manual flight crew inputs 
in the Multifunction Control Display Unit (MCDU), an uplinked route via datalink, or an upload of a route 
modification from AOP. The FMS displays MOD route information on the MCDU and ND so that the flight crew 
can evaluate any impacts on navigation and guidance prior to implementation. AOP‘s FMS MOD Route probe 
complements this information by providing any impacts on the aircraft‘s self-separation requirements. 
AOP‘s FMS MOD Route probe has two main functions: 
 Perform conflict detection on the MOD route to identify what conflicts would exist if the MOD route were 
executed with LNAV and VNAV engaged. 
 Determine if the MOD route would fail to achieve any required time of arrival (RTA) constraints that exist 
in the route if the MOD route were executed with LNAV and VNAV engaged. 
If the MOD route is conflict-free and meets all of its RTA constraints, the SNAPI will indicate ―CLEAR‖ on the 
line entitled MOD RTE, alerting the flight crew that it is safe to execute the MOD route and engage LNAV and 
VNAV (if not already engaged). If a conflict is detected along the MOD route, the SNAPI will indicate 
―CAUTION‖ or ―NOT AVBL‖ (not available), alerting the flight crew that a conflict will be created if the MOD 
route is executed. If the MOD route is conflict-free but unable to achieve an RTA constraint defined in the route, the 
SNAPI will indicate ―UNABLE RTA‖, alerting the flight crew that a modification to the MOD route is required to 
achieve all of its constraints. In both the conflict and ―UNABLE RTA‖ cases, the flight crew has several choices for 
dealing with the MOD route: 
 Use AOP‘s MOD Route automatic resolution capability (see below) to adjust the current MOD Route until 
it is both conflict-free and meets all of its constraints, if possible, and then implement the MOD route. 
 Modify the MOD route through manual inputs in the MCDU until the FMS MOD Route probe says the 
route is CLEAR and then implement the MOD route. 
 Erase the MOD route. 
 Implement the MOD route without modification. 
The final option is available, since AOP does not prevent the flight crew from implementing a conflicted MOD 
route. Selecting this option, however, may be against operational procedures. The FMS MOD Route probe‘s 
function is merely to alert the crew to the impact of implementing the MOD route; the crew always make the final 




Figure 4. SNAPI representation for conflict 
prevention probes. 




B. Tactical Planning Probe 
AOP‘s Tactical Planning probe supports the flight crew in safely making changes to certain tactical (non-LNAV 
and non-VNAV) guidance modes. If the change in guidance mode (see next section) is conflict-free, the SNAPI will 
indicate ―CLEAR‖ on the MCP PLN line. If the change would result in a conflict, the SNAPI will indicate 
―CAUTION‖ or ―NOT AVBL‖ on this line. 
The Tactical Planning probe is triggered when it identifies ―non-active displacements‖ in the track/heading 
and/or altitude windows on the MCP. Laterally, if the ownship is in LNAV, track hold (TRK HLD), or heading hold 
(HDG HLD) mode, any difference between the MCP track/heading window value and the aircraft‘s current 
track/heading value is considered a non-active displacement since this difference does not cause the aircraft‘s 
current guidance mode to attempt to achieve the MCP track/heading window value. Vertically, if the ownship is in 
VNAV or ALT HLD mode, any difference between the MCP altitude window value and the aircraft‘s current 
altitude is considered a non-active displacement. Either a lateral or vertical non-active displacement is sufficient to 
trigger AOP‘s Tactical Planning probe. 
When triggered, the Tactical Planning probe alerts the flight crew to any conflicts that would exist if the crew 
were to simultaneously make all non-active displacements (both lateral and vertical) ―active‖. This means assuming 
a switch to a guidance mode that would attempt to achieve the value in the MCP track/heading and/or altitude 
window. For lateral non-active displacements, the guidance mode assumed by the Tactical Planning probe depends 
on whether the MCP indicator for the track/heading window is set to TRACK or HEADING. If it is set to TRACK, 
the lateral mode is assumed to switch to TRK SEL. If set to HEADING, the lateral mode is assumed to switch to 
HDG SEL. For all vertical non-active displacements, the Tactical Planning probe assumes a switch to FLCH. No 
guidance mode switch is assumed for either lateral or vertical maneuvers if there is no non-active displacement. 
In practice, the flight crew uses the Tactical Planning probe to determine whether a change to a tactical (non-
FMS) guidance mode is safe to perform before executing the maneuver. For example, assuming that the MCP 
track/heading indicator is currently set to TRACK and the aircraft is in LNAV and VNAV, the pilot can simply 
adjust the MCP track window value as desired and the Tactical Planning will alert the flight crew to any conflicts 
that would occur if the lateral guidance mode was changed to TRK SEL (which initiates the turn) while the vertical 
guidance mode remains in VNAV. Alternatively, if the pilot had dialed in just a new MCP altitude value, the 
Tactical Planning will alert the flight crew to any conflicts that would occur if the vertical guidance mode was 
changed to FLCH (which initiates the maneuver) while the lateral guidance mode remains in LNAV. If both a track 
and altitude value were dialed in, the Tactical Planning will alert the flight crew to any conflicts that would occur if 
the lateral guidance mode was changed to TRK SEL and the vertical guidance mode was changed to FLCH, 
resulting in simultaneous lateral and vertical maneuvers (e.g., a climbing turn). If the Tactical Planning probe says 
CLEAR, the pilot can safely engage the desired tactical mode to achieve the new MCP window value. 
C. Active Route Recouple Probe 
AOP assumes that the active route in the FMS represents the most strategic plan of the flight crew and that, if the 
aircraft is not currently in LNAV and VNAV and following the active route, the objective of the flight crew is to 
eventually get back to this guidance state. In situations where the aircraft is not currently in LNAV and/or VNAV, 
but its position and altitude are such that these modes can be engaged (not just armed), the flight crew needs to 
assess whether engaging LNAV and VNAV will cause any undesirable impacts on AFR procedures. This is the 
purpose of the Active Route Recouple probe. 
Similar to the MOD Route probe, AOP‘s Active Route Recouple probe has two main functions: 
 Perform conflict detection on the active route to identify what conflicts would exist if LNAV and VNAV 
were both engaged at the current time. 
 Determine if the active route would fail to achieve any RTA constraints that exist in the route if LNAV and 
VNAV were both engaged at the current time. 
If the active route is conflict-free and meets all of its RTA constraints, the SNAPI will indicate ―CLEAR‖ on the 
line entitled LNAV VNAV, alerting the flight crew that it is safe to engage LNAV and VNAV. If a conflict is 
detected along the active route, the SNAPI will indicate ―CAUTION‖ or ―NOT AVBL‖, alerting the flight crew that 
a conflict will be created if LNAV and VNAV are engaged. If the active route is conflict-free but unable to achieve 
an RTA constraint defined in the route, the SNAPI will indicate ―UNABLE RTA‖, alerting the flight crew that a 
modification to the active route is required to achieve all of its constraints. In both the ―CONFLICT‖ and ―UNABLE 
RTA‖ cases, the flight crew has several choices: 
 Use AOP‘s Active Route Recouple automatic resolution capability (see below) to adjust the active route 
until it is both conflict-free and meets all of its constraints, if possible, and then engage LNAV and VNAV. 




 Create a MOD route through manual inputs in the MCDU and modify it until the FMS MOD Route probe 
says the MOD route is CLEAR, then implement the MOD route. 
 Engage LNAV and VNAV without modification to the active route. 
As previously noted in the case of a conflicted MOD route, engaging LNAV and VNAV without modifying the 
active route to remove conflicts is possible but may be against operational procedures. 
If the aircraft position and altitude are such that LNAV and VNAV cannot be engaged, the SNAPI will indicate 
―NO PROBE‖, indicating to the flight crew that attempting to select LNAV and VNAV at that time is an 
unprotected action. 
D. Maneuver Restriction (MR) Bands 
Similar to the function of the Tactical Planning probe, MR Bands are created to protect the flight crew when 
making tactical guidance changes. Unlike the Tactical Planning probe, MR Bands protect a wide range of lateral and 
vertical setting changes, but they do not guarantee that the resulting change will be completely conflict-free. Under 
autonomous flight rules, it is unacceptable for an AFR aircraft to make a trajectory change that results in a near-term 
conflict for either the ownship or the traffic aircraft. Although still a subject of research, a typical time horizon 
defining a near-term conflict is five minutes. MR Bands are designed to ensure that the tactical maneuver performed 
will not create a near-term conflict, though it purposefully does not protect creating a conflict with a larger time to 
first LOS, which may be operationally necessary in certain complex traffic situations. As such, MR Bands are 
primarily used by the flight crew when quick, safe maneuvers are required. The other conflict prevention 
capabilities, which ensure that the resultant change is completely conflict-free, are typically preferred when more 
planning time is available. In practice, MR Bands are often used to make fast decisions about the direction of tactical 
maneuvering (e.g., turning left or right) and then the Tactical Planning probe is used to refine the final MCP window 
value to achieve a completely conflict-free solution. 
There are three types of MR Bands created by AOP: 
 Track/Heading bands, 
 Vertical Speed bands, and 
 FLCH Altitude bands.  
For Track/Heading bands, a range of track or 
heading values (depending on the MCP track/heading 
indicator) are probed, each assuming a lateral guidance 
mode of either TRK SEL or HDG SEL (again, based on 
the MCP track/heading indicator) and a vertical mode 
set to the aircraft‘s current vertical mode. The probe is 
purposefully limited to the longest look-ahead at which 
a near-term conflict could be detected for either the 
ownship or traffic aircraft. For each track/heading value 
probed that detects a conflict, that value is considered 
blocked. Adjacent values that are all blocked create a 
band stretching from the first contiguous track/heading 
value blocked to the last. The MR Band capability 
checks all track/heading values from +90 degrees to -90 
degrees of the aircraft‘s current track/heading value, 
identifying all bands in this range. The bands are 
displayed on the PFD (see Fig. 5) and the Navigation 
Display (see Fig. 2). 
Vertical Speed bands are calculated in a similar 
way. The vertical guidance mode is assumed to be V/R 
HLD, the lateral guidance mode is the aircraft‘s current 
lateral guidance mode, and a range of vertical rate 
values from -8000 fpm to 6000 fpm are probed. The Vertical Speed bands created are displayed on the vertical 
speed tape of the PFD when the aircraft‘s vertical guidance mode is V/R HLD. 
The crew use Track/Heading and Vertical Speed bands in similar manners. To ensure no near-term conflicts will 
arise, the pilot dials the appropriate MCP window value until it is a value that is in a gap between any displayed 
bands. The pilot then executes the maneuver by engaging the proper guidance mode (TRK/HDG SEL or V/R HLD). 
  
 
Figure 5. Displays of Track/Heading and Vertical 
Speed MR Bands on PFD 




Since MR Bands are always being calculated, this approach works even when the aircraft is already in TRK/HDG 
SEL or V/R HLD, which is another difference between this capability and the Tactical Planning probe. 
The FLCH altitude bands probe two cardinal altitudes (+1000 ft and +2000 ft) above and two cardinal altitudes 
(-1000 ft and -2000 ft) below the aircraft‘s current altitude. The vertical guidance mode is assumed to be FLCH and 
the lateral guidance mode is the aircraft‘s current lateral guidance mode. The FLCH altitude bands are displayed on 
the SNAPI (see Fig. 4). If a probed altitude value detects a near-term conflict, the SNAPI displays ―BLOCKED‖ for 
that altitude, otherwise it displays no information on that altitude line. 
The continuous availability of MR bands and the simple interface for entering values and executing new 
guidance modes (if any) makes the use of MR bands very effective for quick, evasive maneuvering. 
VIII. Strategic Intent-Based Conflict Resolution 
Strategic intent-based conflict resolution (SICR) is a capability within AOP that can find routes that the ownship 
could follow in full LNAV and VNAV guidance modes without conflict. 
A. Resolving Primary Conflicts 
The first and most essential role of SICR in the AOP is to resolve conflicts with the ownship‘s strategic intent, 
that is, when the ownship‘s intent is to follow the FMS active route in full LNAV and VNAV guidance modes. If the 
ownship is flying in this mode and the primary probe detects a conflict, SICR proposes a resolution route and 
enables the crew to execute this route as the new active route of the FMS. The resolution route is calculated to be 
conflict-free, that is, it resolves all conflicts with the current active route and creates no new conflicts. 
Figure 6 illustrates an example of the procedure for resolving a primary conflict. In this example, SICR has 
generated three resolution routes (lateral, vertical, and combined), among which the vertical resolution is currently 
the ―selected‖ resolution. The figure shows a page of the MCDU that is part of the interface to the AOP. The crew 
can upload this as a new FMS MOD Route by pressing 
the UPLOAD button on this MCDU page. 
B. Meeting a Required Time of Arrival 
When the active route includes an RTA, any SICR 
performed on the primary probe attempts to find a 
resolution route that meets the RTA and avoids all 
conflicts. When no such route is found, the SICR 
algorithm falls back to a “relaxed‖ resolution route that is 
conflict-free and misses the RTA by the minimum 
possible time difference. 
The SICR capability can also be invoked when the 
current active route is already conflict-free but has missed 
an RTA. In that case, the resolution route (if one is found) 
will meet the RTA without creating any conflicts. For 
example, if an RTA is assigned that will require a delay 
maneuver, SICR is useful in plotting a conflict-free path 
that will absorb the required delay. 
C. Separation and Lookahead Requirements for 
SICR 
The assertion that the resolution route is conflict-free 
is based on a full ―SICR probe‖ of an ownship trajectory 
based on the resolution route. The SICR probe is similar 
to the primary probe, but with two important differences: 
 The SICR probe uses the resolution route in 
place of the current active route of the FMS. 
 The separation requirements for the SICR probe 
are typically somewhat greater than the 
requirements for the primary probe. 
The difference in separation requirements serves as a 
―buffer‖ to protect against minor differences that might 
 
 
Figure 6. MCDU ready to upload a resolution route 
to the FMS. 




occur between the trajectory computed for the resolution route during SICR and the trajectory computed for the 
same route after it is executed as a new active route. Such differences could occur due to sensor error or other minor 
discrepancies between the reported ownship or traffic states from which the first trajectory is computed and the later 
states that are used when the second trajectory is computed. 
A typical lookahead time for the SICR probe used in AOP research is 20 minutes, much longer than the 10 
minutes typically used for the primary probe. The purpose of this difference is to avoid frequent repetition of the 
SICR procedure, and thereby to reduce crew workload. If SICR can find a resolution route that goes at least 20 
minutes without conflict, and if there are no further changes to ownship or traffic intent (other than executing the 
resolution route) or to area hazards, and if the errors in the predictions on which SICR was based stay within the 
limits of their respective TPUBs, then at least 10 minutes should elapse from the beginning of this latest invocation 
of the SICR procedure until the next primary conflict is detected and needs to be resolved. Even when these 
conditions do not hold, it may be expected that conflicts will tend not to occur as frequently as they might if the 
lookahead for SICR were the same as for the primary probe. 
D. Resolving Conflicts with Other Probes 
In addition to the primary probe, SICR can resolve conflicts that are detected by the FMS MOD Route probe or 
by the Active Route Recouple probe. The crew can upload (and, if appropriate, execute) the resulting resolution 
route to obtain a new, conflict-free FMS MOD route or active route according to the procedures described in 
Section VII (―Conflict Prevention‖). 
The SICR algorithms for these two probes are essentially the same as for the primary probe. The objective is to 
modify the given route (MOD route or active route) so that it is conflict-free. 
E. SICR Algorithms 
The AOP is designed and architected to provide a choice 
among different algorithms for SICR. The current 
implementation uses the pattern-based genetic algorithm 
(PBGA),
9,10
 configurable for lateral, vertical, and/or 
combination maneuvers. A resolution route generated by 
PBGA is the result of applying a parameterized 
transformation (a maneuver pattern) to an input route, usually 
initiating a ―maneuver‖ away from that route at one point and 
returning to it at another point. For example, in order to 
resolve a primary conflict, PBGA will apply a maneuver 
pattern to the current active route of the FMS. Figure 7 shows 
the form and parameters of the Direct Intercept pattern for 
lateral maneuvers, one of several maneuver patterns currently 
implemented in PBGA. 
In order to converge toward a conflict-free route, PBGA 
includes a fitness function that assesses the amount of 
―conflicted‖ airspace (including possible new conflicts due to 
maneuvers) on each side of a route, and favors routes that are 
closer to the ―edge‖ of this airspace. A conflict-free route is 
always preferred over one with conflicts. The fitness function 
penalizes a missed RTA. 
Past versions of AOP supported a PBGA tuned to a flow-
corridor operational concept involving self-separation called 
Dynamic Multi-track Airways
11
 as well as an early 
perturbation-based genetic algorithm for the AFR concept.
12
  
F. Optimization of Resolution Routes 
Among the routes generated by PBGA that are conflict-
free (and meet their RTAs when applicable), the fitness 
function of PBGA favors more ―optimal‖ routes. The AOP 
can be configured to use any of several different optimization 




Figure 7. An example of a maneuver pattern in 
PBGA: the Direct Intercept pattern. 




G. Strategic Reroute 
The Strategic Reroute capability in the AOP enables the crew to request a conflict-free route that will 
―reconnect‖ to the existing active route when the ownship has left the active route. To accomplish this, the AOP 
invokes SICR using the current active route as input to PBGA, which applies a pattern especially designed for this 
purpose. This ―reconnect‖ pattern bases the start of its maneuver on the ownship‘s current state rather than on the 
active route, but ends the maneuver on the active route. 
H. Automatic Initiation of Conflict Resolution 
In order to minimize the perceived time to perform the CR algorithm, the AOP will automatically initiate 
strategic resolution (if available) upon first detection of the conflict. If the MCDU is currently displaying one of the 
pages corresponding to any of the SICR capabilities (primary CR, FMS MOD route CR, FMS active route recouple 
CR, or strategic reroute), the AOP will initiate the corresponding strategic resolution when applicable. Otherwise, 
the selection of the SICR function to perform is based on the history of pages displayed on the MCDU and on an 
underlying prioritization of the SICR functions. 
IX. Tactical Intent-Based Conflict Resolution 
The Tactical Intent-based Conflict Resolution (TICR) function of AOP enables it to provide advisories to ensure 
self-separation when any tactical guidance mode
†††
 of the aircraft is engaged or as a fallback from SICR in the event 
that SICR is unable to provide a resolution.
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 The capabilities of TICR include exhaustive probing of the solution 
space, conflict-avoidance relaxation, weather-conflict relaxation, maneuver stabilization, and implicit coordination, 
as explained below. In support of these capabilities, TICR uses fitness rules to weigh these parameters in a manner 
that allows TICR to converge on the best possible conflict-free manuever in any given situation. Where constraint or 
conflict relaxation is allowed, a fitness penalty is added to place these less desirable solutions in the proper 
relationship with conflict-free solutions. 
A. Tactical Intent-Based Maneuvers 
Any advisory (or tactical resolution) provided by TICR is a maneuver defined by a tactical guidance mode and 
(in most cases) by a heading, track angle, or altitude. Lateral maneuvers can be defined by the HDG SEL or TRK 
SEL modes, in which case the maneuver is a turn to capture a heading or track angle. Vertical maneuvers can be 
defined by a FLCH or ALT HLD mode; a FLCH maneuver would climb or descend to capture an altitude. The crew 
can implement the advisory (if they deem it acceptable) by setting the advised heading, track angle, or altitude in the 
track/heading or altitude window of the MCP and then engaging the advised guidance mode. 
B. Exhaustive Search of Solution Space 
The TICR function performs ―sweeps,‖ each of which probes a discrete set of manuevers consisting of a single 
guidance mode and advised headings, track angles, or altitudes spaced at regular intervals, usually 1 degree (lateral) 
or 1000 feet (vertical) apart, within a predefined ―sweep‖ range. This range is currently defined to be +/- 60 degrees 
from the current track or heading and +/- 10,000 feet from the current altitude, whichever applies. Experience has 
shown that when these maneuvers are probed in sequence, the first conflict-free maneuver found is not always the 
most desirable, even if the sequence of probes is carefully constructed. Therefore, each ―sweep‖ probes its entire 
solution space, allowing the algorithm to evaluate each maneuver according to the relevant fitness rules, and selects 
the maneuver whose fitness was best. 
C. TICR as a Strategic Separation Assurance Fallback 
The SICR capability of the AOP is a powerful tool for resolving conflicts and keeping the aircraft flying in a 
strategic mode with full FMS guidance.
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 Certain conditions, however, such as local airspace complexity or conflict 
proximity, may prevent SICR from providing a suitable conflict-free advisory. In this situation, the TICR capability 
will automatically activate and will provide a conflict-free advisory if it is able, ensuring continuity of separation 
assurance. The advisory will recommend leaving FMS guidance and entering a tactical guidance mode. The 
Strategic Reroute capability of the AOP can be used later to return safely to full FMS guidance. The AOP will also 
allow the pilot to force TICR guidance to be provided in lieu of SICR capability, if desired for an operational reason. 
 
                                                          
†††
 As defined earlier, a tactical guidance mode is any mode other than LNAV and VNAV. 




D. Maneuver Stability 
Where a range of conflict-free maneuvers is available, the TICR algorithm will weigh these maneuvers with 
respect to their their impact on the ownship‘s current situation. For example, if the ownship is currently turning left 
and conflict-free maneuvers exist both to the left and to the right, the fitness function of TICR will give maneuvers 
to the left a higher preference than maneuvers to the right, since that does not require a change in direction of turn. 
Similar considerations hold for altitude maneuvers. Additionally, a maneuver that requires a small change in 
heading, track angle, or altitude will be favored over a maneuver requiring a larger change. Where a range of 
conflict-free maneuvers lies between conflicted maneuvers, the tactical resolution will be biased toward the center of 
that range. This minimizes the chance that a minor change in the predictions on which the conflicts were based will 
cause a new conflict and require the ownship to maneuver again. 
E. Implicit Coordination 
Another factor influencing the fitness of conflict-free maneuvers is the desire to coordinate maneuvers of the 
ownship and traffic aircraft. Two aircraft flying under AFR are allowed to maneuver simultaneously; from the 
perspective of one of those aircraft, these simultaneous maneuvers include an ―ownship‖ maneuver and a ―traffic‖ 
maneuver. A ―sweep‖ performed by TICR compares each of its ownship trajectories against the existing traffic 
trajectories, not against trajectories that would result from a traffic maneuver. Coordination of an ownship maneuver 
occurring simultaneously with a traffic aircraft maneuver ensures that the new ownship trajectory is not in conflict 
with the new traffic trajectory after both maneuvers are performed. This allows the conflict between the two aircraft 
to be resolved as efficiently as possible and without the risk of ―sidewalk‖ behavior, in which simultaneous 
maneuvers by the two aircraft repeatedly put them in conflict with each other.
‡‡‡
 Explicit coordination would require 
a (possibly lengthy) sequence of communications between the aircraft in order to establish agreement. The algorithm 
used by TICR, developed by the Formal Methods group at NASA Langley, performs implicit coordination, in which 
a ―coordinated‖ maneuver by one aircraft is guaranteed not to conflict with any possible ―coordinated‖ maneuver of 
the other aircraft. A coordinated resolution will be given preference over a non-coordinated resolution. 
Only one-on-one conflicts can be coordinated by the existing algorithm. Maneuvers to avoid simultaneous 
conflicts with more than two aircraft cannot be coordinated and this metric is not considered in their overall fitness. 
F. Conflict-Avoidance Relaxation 
A conflict-free solution is always preferred, but it is not possible to find a completely conflict-free solution in all 
situations. While an aircraft flying under AFR is not permitted to maneuver in any way that creates a near-term 
conflict, the AOP may advise a conflict resolution that improves upon the current situation by suggesting a 
maneuver that avoids all near-term conflicts but creates one or more far-term conflicts. In these situations, when the 
ownship executes such a maneuver, all aircraft involved are given more time to find alternate solutions.  
G. Weather-Conflict Relaxation 
While avoiding LOS with a traffic aircraft is mandatory, the same does not always apply to weather. An 
experiment focused on integrated traffic-weather avoidance
15
 evaluated the ability of the AOP to deal with weather 
when the information about weather is limited to the capabilities of the on-board radar system. Assuming no ability 
to predict weather movement in that case, weather cells tend to ―pop up‖ on the path of the aircraft just as they come 
into radar range, usually with a first LOS that is much sooner than the lookahead of the primary probe. To address 
these issues, each ―core‖ weather cell, represented by a polygonal region of the airspace, is surrounded by a larger 
―avoidance zone,‖ which is a configurable convex buffer around the core weather cell. AOP allows no resolution to 
penetrate a core weather cell. The TICR algorithm will also attempt to not penetrate any avoidance zone, but if it 
finds no such resolution, it will allow a resolution that enters an avoidance zone. The fitness function is biased to 
minimize penetration and to penalize maneuvers that approach too close to the core hazard. 
X. Crew Workload and Coordination of Efforts 
With the many trajectories AOP probes, and the various conflict and resolution alerts available to the pilot, 
maintaining acceptable crew workload has been a continual focus of the AOP display and algorithm development. 
To this end, two key concepts, alert levels and priority rules, have been employed to present the flight crew with 
                                                          
‡‡‡
 The term ―sidewalk‖ alludes to a situation in which two pedestrians approach each other along a sidewalk. Each 
makes a slight change in direction—one to his left, the other to her right—in an attempt to step out of the other‘s 
way. In extreme cases, after a series of well-meaning but unfortunate decisions of this sort, the two stop face to face. 




clear and concise information, thus reducing the necessary workload and allowing for improved real-time 
collaboration across aircraft. The combination of these two capabilities directly addresses the issues of when conflict 
information is communicated to the flight crew and how it is to be presented. By filtering conflicts according to their 
AFR alert levels, AOP reduces the amount of information that must be displayed to the flight crew. AOP defines the 
―priority‖ of aircraft in conflict (that is, which one has the ―right of way‖), and initially alerts the conflict to the crew 
only when the ownship has lower priority than the traffic aircraft, thereby helping to avoid uncoordinated responses 
to conflicts. Like implicit coordination, this addresses the ―sidewalk‖ scenario. 
The following subsections provide greater detail about alert levels and priority rules. 
A. Alert Levels 
A key concept underlying the AOP design is to provide dependable conflict alerting to the pilot in all flight 
modes, in order to support the flight crew‘s use of all guidance options available on the flight deck.16 In order to 
provide such alerting in a concise and clear manner, alert levels are assigned to each conflict for later use in 
prioritization and filtering. The rule set containing the logic for assigning these levels is defined in an alerting 
scheme, which may be tailored to the experiment at hand. Aspects such as hazards type (traffic aircraft or area 
hazard such as SUA), trajectory type, and time to separation loss are typically key factors in determining the precise 
alert level of a given conflict. The displays then use alert levels to determine which conflicts to display and to 
provide visual queues to the flight crew as to the nature of each conflict. Currently, AOP supports two displayed 
alert levels and one non-displayed alert level. 
B. Priority Rules 
Priority rules help avoid uncoordinated maneuvers (and ―sidewalk‖ behavior) by determining which aircraft in a 
conflict pair has the ―right of way.‖ When the conflict‘s time to first LOS is close to the full lookahead time for the 
conflict probe, the ―lower priority‖ aircraft is alerted to the conflict first, allowing that aircraft to execute a maneuver 
to resolve the conflict. Should the time to first LOS fall below a specific threshold, the ―priority‖ aircraft will also be 
alerted to the conflict 
As with the alerting levels, priority rules are applied equally under all flight modes in order to support the full 
range of automation on the flight deck. Aircraft flying under IFR are always given the right of way over AFR 
aircraft, relying on the ability of the AFR aircraft to resolve the conflict without intervention from a ground 
controller. For conflicts between autonomous aircraft, the algorithm assigns priority according to a range of other 
characteristics of the aircraft; for example, all other things being equal, an aircraft flying level has priority over a 
climbing aircraft. 
XI. State-Based Conflict Detection and Resolution 
Complementing the intent-based algorithms described above, AOP employs a state-based conflict detection and 
resolution (CD&R) capability to handle extremely short term conflicts and losses of separation with traffic aircraft. 
Using aircraft position and velocity vector information for both ownship and traffic aircraft, the state-based 
algorithm uses simple state projections to predict and resolve near-term traffic conflicts. Although these projections 
ignore all information regarding the future intent of both aircraft, such projections are acceptable for the short time 
horizons encountered when tactical maneuvers are required in close proximity to loss. These projections are probed 
for conflicts using configurable separation standards that are independent of those used by the intent-based probes. 
State-based conflicts, if detected, are reported in a manner consistent with their intent-based counterparts, while 
state-based resolutions are advised as specific tactical guidance settings similar to TICR. State-based versions of MR 
bands are also generated as part of the state-based advisories and are displayed in the same manner as the intent-
based MR bands. 
The state-based CD&R approach within AOP has evolved over time from an intent-based override capability, 
where a detected state-based conflict would automatically disengage the intent-based CD&R capabilities at medium 
times to LOS (3–5 minutes), to a separation loss recovery fallback following strategic and tactical intent-based 
detection and resolution failures. The former approach was employed as part of a simulation conducted in 2004.
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As a result of this experiment, several issues were brought to light. The most significant was the tendency for the 
state-based system to incorrectly override the intent-based system during initial descents to the terminal airspace. 
This behavior was caused by the inaccuracy of the state-based projection of constant groundspeed and vertical rate 
during the descent phase of flight. 
Recently, AOP‘s previous approaches to state-based CD&R (NLR18and KB3D19) have been replaced with 
Airborne Coordinated Conflict Resolution and Detection (ACCoRD) algorithms developed at NASA Langley 






 Integrated into AOP to support separation loss recovery, this approach becomes active 
shortly before loss (typically 30 seconds or less) in order to assist the flight crew in effectively managing, or 
possibly avoiding, the impending protected zone penetration. It should be noted that the new triggering mechanism 
used for initiation of state-based CD&R is a conflict detected by the intent-based conflict detection capability whose 
time to first LOS falls below a prescribed state-based activation threshold. 
Once active, the state-based conflict detector probes for conflicts using a look-ahead time of five minutes. 
Should one or more state-based conflicts be detected, the conflict with the shortest time to first LOS will be reported 
by AOP; this is consistent with the resolution approach of the ACCoRD algorithm, which gives special attention to 
the most critical conflict. In addition to conflict first and last LOS positions and time, the resolution function 
provides independent guidance targets for track and vertical rate to optimally avoid conflicts with all traffic, not just 
the most critical one, thereby offering a clear path away from the conflict without introducing additional conflicts 
and subsequent maneuvers. When possible, the targets are selected by an algorithm that implicitly coordinates the 
ownship maneuver with the possible maneuvers of the traffic aircraft causing the most critical conflict.
21
 Like the 
implicit coordination algorithm in TICR, this algorithm helps to avoid ―sidewalk‖ behavior. In addition, the 
resolution function indicates whether the guidance targets are implicitly coordinated, whether the track target avoids 
the protected zone, and whether the track target or the vertical rate target provides a better resolution. In the event 
that no state-based conflict is detected (for example, when the relevant intent-based conflict is caused by a turn), a 
state resolution indicating that the aircraft maintain its present track and vertical rate is provided to the flight crew. 
XII. Advances in the Integration of Flight-Deck Functions 
As self-separation research has progressed at NASA LaRC, new AOP capabilities have been developed and 
existing capabilities extended to meet the challenges of an advanced, distributed control operational concept. This 
has led to new and novel approaches within several areas of separation assurance research, including some that 
extend beyond the specific application to the flight deck. Some of the highlights are presented below. 
A. Integration of Strategic and Tactical CD&R. 
To support the many complex guidance modes available to the flight crew, AOP has a fully integrated, adaptive 
suite of CD and CR functions. The primary focus is on intent-based conflict detection with either a strategic (SICR) 
or tactical (TICR) resolution capability, depending on the current aircraft guidance mode. In challenging conflict 
scenarios, if strategic resolutions become unavailable, AOP automatically falls back to TICR; once tactical 
maneuvering is complete, AOP‘s Strategic Reroute function helps the flight crew reconnect the aircraft position to 
the current FMS active route. In the rare cases where a loss of separation does occur, AOP automatically engages 
state-based conflict detection and resolution capabilities to support the flight crew in safely regaining separation. 
Once separation has been reestablished, intent-based conflict detection and resolution automatically reengage. 
AOP‘s approach to CD&R anticipates the needs of the flight crew and provides smooth transitions in and out of 
strategic flight, as necessary. 
B. Use of Conflict Prevention Capabilities. 
AOP supports the flight crew in making safe changes to the aircraft‘s guidance settings that are not driven by 
separation assurance needs. By determining the impacts of a proposed guidance change prior to execution, AOP 
enables the flight crew to maintain self-separation when making any guidance changes within the wide range of 
potential FMS-based and non-FMS-based guidance settings available to the flight crew. In the case of FMS-based 
guidance, if an FMS MOD route would result in a conflict or an unmet RTA constraint, AOP provides automated 
resolution capabilities to enable the flight crew to adjust the MOD route to meet the requirements of airborne self-
separation while still achieving the objectives of their original proposed change. In support of non-FMS-based 
guidance, AOP monitors non-active changes to the MCP track/heading and altitude window values, enabling the 
flight crew to probe tactical maneuvers quickly and effectively before switching to a mode that will capture the new 
window value. 
C. Support for distributed control. 
The main challenge for any distributed control ATC environment is how to make sure that simultaneous 
maneuvers between aircraft do not result in undesired conflicts or losses of separation. AOP‘s intent-based (SICR 
and TICR) and state-based CD&R capabilities have been tuned to the needs of a distributed control environment. 
AOP‘s use of priority rules reduces the chance that two aircraft will simultaneously maneuver to resolve the same 
conflict by giving the non-priority aircraft a chance to resolve the conflict before it is alerted to the priority aircraft. 




When both aircraft do maneuver to resolve the same conflict, AOP‘s tactical and state-based resolutions use implicit 
coordination rules, reducing the chance that the resolutions selected by each aircraft will result in a new conflict. 
D. Advanced Trajectory Prediction for All Aircraft Guidance Modes. 
Unlike the trajectory predictor within the FMS, AOP‘s trajectory prediction algorithms can predict all of the 
possible guidance mode combinations available to the flight crew, including fully FMS-based modes 
(LNAV/VNAV), non-FMS-based modes, and hybrid combinations of FMS-based and non-FMS-based modes (e.g., 
LNAV and FLCH). AOP is also capable of predicting conditional switches in guidance modes. For example, an 
aircraft in TRK HLD with LNAV in the armed state will switch to LNAV only if the aircraft‘s position gets within a 
defined distance of the FMS active route. The development of AOP‘s algorithms to predict conditional guidance 
mode switching required capabilities beyond the state-of-the-art in trajectory prediction at the time and led directly 
to advances in the conceptual modeling of trajectory predictors.
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E. Fast Conflict Detection Algorithms with Built-In Uncertainty Handling. 
Several advances were made to AOP‘s conflict detection algorithms to deal with the challenges of the airborne 
self-separation requirement. To meet the need for completing CD for several hundred aircraft in a few hundred 
milliseconds, AOP algorithms forgo time consuming uniform-trajectory-discretization and pre-filtering techniques 
for a highly efficient and more accurate continuous-motion technique. To handle the variation in trajectory 
prediction accuracy between different trajectory generation sources (ownship vs. traffic), the TPUBs approach to 
uncertainty bounds was developed and integrated directly into both the trajectory generation and conflict detection 
algorithms. The end result is a fast, accurate CD algorithm with a highly customizable approach to handling 
prediction uncertainty. 
F. Handling Mixed Traffic Intent Environments. 
AOP‘s approach to handling traffic aircraft data has been developed to accept a wide range of potential data 
sources, including ADS-B and SWIM. For ADS-B, AOP supports the full range of potential future ADS-B data 
available, including both target state and multiple-TCP trajectory change reports. For each traffic aircraft, AOP 
identifies the most strategic source of ADS-B data available that passes a set of real-time consistency checks with 
respect to the aircraft‘s current state vector report and builds a trajectory based on that data. Recently, AOP has 
added processing to integrate uplinked SWIM data into this approach, assuming SWIM is more strategic than ADS-
B target state data, but less desirable than ADS-B trajectory change report data being sent directly from the traffic 
aircraft. 
G. Integrated Conflict Resolution and Flight Optimization. 
AOP‘s SICR capability has been designed to provide routes for upload into the FMS that are not only conflict-
free but also have been optimized based on a predefined objective by the flight crew. Options include optimizing 
global trajectory parameters (e.g., fuel burned, time or distance flown) or optimizing based on the geometry of the 
specific pattern used (e.g., minimize offset distance). Unlike functions dedicated solely to route optimization, SICR 
optimizes routes while giving priority to resolving and avoiding conflicts. In particular, SICR optimizes routes only 
after a conflict-free solution has been found. This approach may sacrifice some level of flight optimization, but 
increases the probability of finding conflict-free solutions, which is of primary importance for conflict resolution. 
H. Advanced Weather Avoidance. 
Unlike some CR approaches, each resolution generated by an AOP resolution algorithm (SICR and TICR) 
provides a single, integrated solution to resolve all detected traffic and area hazard (weather, SUA) conflicts. This 
means the resolutions provided to avoid both traffic and area hazards are no more complex than the solutions 
available for just traffic conflicts. TICR adds the ability to relax the need to avoid certain weather hazards 
(avoidance zones) if the only alternative is to remain in conflict with a traffic aircraft. Both SICR and TICR 
algorithms continue to be enhanced to work with various sources of weather data, including both on-board weather 
radar data and uplinked weather information. 
 
 





The architecture, algorithms, and implementation of AOP provide powerful tools to support AFR operations 
across a wide range of conditions. The trajectory prediction and conflict detection functions in AOP use a broad 
selection of data available from avionics in order to make useful predictions of all aircraft trajectories, supporting a 
comprehensive range of predictable guidance modes of the ownship aircraft (including FMS-guided flight, guidance 
independent of the FMS, and partial tactical overrides of the FMS) and several levels of enhanced or degraded data 
describing traffic aircraft. The conflict detection algorithm and its controlling parameters can be precisely tuned to 
alert flight crews to developing problems when they should be solved, and to avoid (to the extent practical) false 
notifications of problems or excessive notifications of problems that are less urgent. Moreover, several possible 
pitfalls of self-separation, such as the so-called "sidewalk" behavior, have been identified and effectively eliminated 
by multiple, complementary layers of protection. 
The maneuvers that AOP's conflict resolution algorithms generate in response to conflicts and other problems 
are simple, efficient (due to well-integrated optimization criteria) and robust. Most resolutions are "global," 
simultaneously meeting constraints such as required time of arrival (when applicable) and accounting for all known 
hazards, including hazards of several disparate types (such as aircraft, SUAs, and weather cells). These and other 
functions supporting flight crews adapt automatically to changing conditions either in the airspace or in the 
ownship's guidance. 
The history of AOP shows a proven track record of usefulness in the investigation of a variety of aspects of the 
AFR concept within a variety of detailed definitions of the concept. The capabilities developed for AOP represent 
significant advances in the state of the art. New capabilities continue to be integrated into the suite and refined. It is 
expected that ongoing and future research efforts will continue to use versions of this prototype system to investigate 
and improve the AFR concept. 
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